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and has yet Lo
the Falklands,
To speak
a sub j ect, of
records that.
claim Lo the The firsL nations Eo
square miles in total
off Lhe southern coasL
no trustwort,hy historical
to whom made the firsL
make cl-aims about t.heir
The Accounts of the Falklands/Ma1vinas War and a Projection of the
Future of the Isl-ands
To name
proportion) of
of ArgenLina is to engage a constant debate that. is stil1 open today
Lhese islands arereach a resolut.ion. To the BriLish,
and to the Argentines they are Lhe Malvinas.
of whom first discovered the Falklands/Malvinas is also
a group of smal1 islands (+,100
bare semi-rocky 1and, 300 miles
debate. In reality, there are
unbiased informat,ioncan give
islands.
'discovery' were Spain and England in t.he sixteent.h century. Two
cenLuries after t.hese claims were made, France also made a claim to
the islands: "The famous French explorer Louis-Antoine de Bougainville
was said Lo be an early discoverer during voyages in the !760s."1 It
was from this claim t.hat. the Spanish-speaking world gave the islands
the name of 'Malvinas;' the sailors of the expedition were from Saint.
Malo, France, thus t.hey named the islands 'Les Isles Malouines,' a
term converted into the Spanish language as 'Las Islas Maluinas,'
which consequently evolved into 'Malvinas' in modern Spanish. *An
lEugene L
Greenwood Press,
Rasor, The Falklands/Malvinas Campaign (Westport, Connecticut:
L992) , 14.
original accounL [on the French 'discovery'1 was by Antonie Pernety,
published in t.hree volumes in French in 1759 and in English in L787."2
Since their discovery in Lhe sixteenth century, there were never
permanent settlements on the islands until the nineteenth cenLury.
Before l-833, Spain, France and Great, Brit.ain established setLlements,
but those were abandoned.
Since Argentina officially gained its independence in 1818, the
Falklands/Malvinas were considered by Lhe new ArgenLine government as
Argentine soil on the grounds that Spain had sovereignty over the
is1ands and the Argentine terriLory before the independence movemenL.
The young Argentine administration then assumed that the islands were
a part of the mainl-and counLry of Argentina: "The Argentine position
claims that Argentina succeeded to Spain's sovereignty rights over the
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in accordance with principles of
international 1aw."3 Spain, for its part, had claimed the islands on
account of having discovered and ruled over the Americas, in which on
May 4, L4g3 Pope Alexander VI 'awarded' Spain exclusive right Lo claim
and conLrof over any area west of an imaginary line parting from
approximately present-day BrazLl-' s western boundaries.
Due to political Lensions in the nineteenth century, on January
2, 1833, Great Britain invaded t.he Falklands/Malvinas and made a
permanent. settlement there. The islands remained under British conLrol
for over 145 years.
'tbid.3Roberto C. Laver, The FalkJands/MaTvinas Case (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2001"), 7o.
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In the 1950s,
seLLlements around the
following Lhe decolonization
world after Lhe end of World War
at the United Nat.ions Generaldemands
of European
If , Argent.ine
Assembly for
islands. Talks
diplomats made
Great Britain
It was on
forces suddenly
came as compleLe
to wit.hdraw f rom t,he Falklands/Malvinas
back and forth between diplomats Lo
over a decadefor
the United Nations from both
and a half. A resolution wascountries took place
never achieved and
deteriorat.ed.
relations beLween Argent.ina and Great Britain
of April 2, !982 that Argentinet,he morning
invaded the
shock to the
Falklands/Malvinas
isl-anders and to the United Kingdom. The
modern armed
islands. The
milit.ary
invasion
long-stand dispute over Lhe islands had reached a
conflict. Over 1,000 ArgenLine marines and Special Forces troops
battled the British garison of 80 soldiers. The f ight last.ed for
about three hours, unLil- the British soldiers had no choice buL to
surrender Lo the overwhelming Argentine miliEary force.
The motives for t.his invasion came from Argentine's unpopular
milit.ary regime. At. the time, the country was going through a period
of extreme economic struggle and the regime was desperate to elevate
their reputation. Under t,he command of General Leopoldo Galt.ieri, who
had been t.he military dictator of Argentina for only four monLhs, dD
amphibious milit.ary campaign was launched on a matter that would unify
t.he nation: the "repossession" of -Las Islas lulaTvinas.
Shortly after the Argentine forces had gained control over the
Falklands/Malvinas, another series of diplomatic talks began at the
Unit.ed NaLions. On April 3, 1982, the United Nations Security Council
?i
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passed Resolution 502 which called for Argent.ina to
miliLary forces from the islands. This resolution was
ArgenLine military governmenL and aIl hopes to end
peacefully were abandoned:
withdraw its
ignored by the
the conflict
The then First Sea Lord Sir Henry Leach had assured Lhe prime
minister that, in terms of being able to make an effecLive
response he coufd have a task force ready at noLice to sail
within 48 hours. Aut.hority was, Lherefore, duly given for that
task force to assemble and to begin to sail- from the following
Monday morning of the 5th of April.a
The passage of t.he British task force from the United Kingdom to
the islands would take three-weeks, but. before t.he force could focus
on liberating the Falklands/Malvinas, they had to reoccupy South
Georgia Island, an Argentine-taken small British outpost on a group of
islands even smafler t,han the Falklands/ltalvinas. These islands are
locat.ed approximately 8OO miles southeast of the FaIklands/Malvinas
islands, but are of no significant. economic value. It was in the
waLers surrounding South Georgia t.hat. the f irst ret,aliations began
against Argentine forces on April 2, 1982, when t.he Argentine
submarine Santa Fe was spotted in the vicinit.y by British war
helicopters. The British helicopters engaged the Santa Fe. The
submarine was crit.ically damaged and put ouL of commission. ILs crew
was captured after bailing-ouL off Lhe shores of South Georgia Island
along with the small Argentine unit who had no option but to surrender
bef ore the overpowering att,acks of t,he British Marines and British
naval fire support.
nrhe Falklands War, written by Steve Gillham and Bob Carruthers, 100 min.,
Dj-scovery Civilization, 2002, DW.
?
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The conflict was Laken to the Falklands/Malvinas within the first
week of May of that year, when British bombers fl-ew out of the
Ascension Island near the equator on
raids on Stanly Port, the capital of
immediately, the Argentine Air Force
against the British fleets, but mosL
Brit.ish intelligence found ouL about
Lhe Atlantic and made a series of
t.he f slands to t.he east. Almost
launched a series of air att,acks
of them were intercepted by the
retaliat.ion was suppressed by
these battle ships, they were
exclusion zor:..e that the British
Royal Air Force and the Argentine air
air-to-air combat.
The mosL controversial episodes on t,he FalkIands/Ma1vinas War
came on May 2, L982, when three Argentine bat.Lle ships were spotted
sailing wiLh their courses set on the islands. At the time when
within 30 miles from entering the
government had declared around t,he islands. After consultation within
200
the British War Cabinet, t,he British submarine Congueror was ordered
to attack t.he Argent.ine warships on grounds thaL they posed a threat
able to t.raiI the shipsto the BriLish taskforce. The Congueror was
and with its sophist,icated weaponry was able t.o sink the
General Belgrano. This ship was one of t.he
Pearl Harbor ,-Tapanese attacks during World War
United States had sold the ship to Argentina
surviving
II. After
light cruiser
ships at t.he
the war, the
and it, was now at the
center of a world controversy.
General Belgrano, it.s course was
away from the Falklands/Ma1vinas
the exclusion zor,e. This was the
At the time of t.he sinking of the
Laking it back to Argentine port. and
and its location was well ouLside of
first naval loss for the ArgenLine
number offorces and it claimed nearly half of the country's total
t I
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casualties. With t.his at.tack
war. A11 the Argentine naval
come ouL again during Lhis war
the Argentine Navy was put out of t.he
units returned to their ports to never
Revenge for the sinking of the General Belgrano came raLher
quickly. Two days afLer the sinking of Lhe cruiser, df, Argentine jet
fighter aircraft fired a missile at Lhe HMS Sheffield. Even though the
projectile did noL go off, t.he impact of the rocket and Lhe burning
rocket fuel claimed the lives of 20 British seamen aboard the ship.
Many oLhers were burnt and wounded due to the attack.
Over the first three weeks of the month of May, British ground
troops were deployed on the northwestern side of the islands to
confront, the already set.Lled troops of Argentines aL scattered posts.
They chose Lo begin ground retaliat.ion through the norLhwest because
Lhis zone was further away from the main concentrations of ground
Argentine troops near Lhe other end of t.he islands around t.he PorL of
Stanley. The major milestone in the Falklands/Ualvinas War came on May
20, ]982 when Great Britain launched a fuI1-scale ground attack on the
Argent.ine occupying t.roops.
Over Lhe following three weeks the fate of t.he Falklands/tvlalvinas
was to be decided. British troops on land, with the support of heavy
gunship fire, were able Lo guickly advance over t.he grassy and rough
terrain of the islands. Argent,ina retaliated furthermore on a series
of air strikes against BriLish ground troops and warships. These jeL
fighter aircrafts were flown out of the Argentine mainland because t.he
Falklands/MaIvinas l-acked a sustainable airstrip Lo conEribute with
ghe Argentine war ef f ort . In aII, it was during t.he British land
t
7
campaign that more lives were lost in combat, surprisingly not by
ground troop combat but rather by air raids against British naval
ships off the coasL of Lhe Falklands/tqalvinas. The total number of
warships lost on the Brit.ish side after the devasEating attacks on the
Sheffield was Lwo destroyers and two frigates. This proved t,he
effectiveness of Argentine aerial tacLics.
Despite the l-oses of these naval war vessefs, the British Royal
Navy proved to dominate the waters, but on Lhe contrary, flo clear air
superiority was esLabl-ished by either side. The British forces lost a
total of 10 Harrier jet fighters and 24 helicopLers, while the
Argentines l-ost 25 helicopters and a total of 75 fixed-wing aircrafts.
Most of these were dest.royed while sit.ting at the hangers on the
FalkIands/Malvinas in British Special Forces surprise attacks and
Royal Air Force bombings.
The decisive last four battles over the Falklands/Malvinas came
on the night of ,June 11, l-982 when a brigade-size British ground force
launched an aLtack against the last, st,anding, and the biggesL
Argentine post at Port SLanley. Alt.hough the major concentraLion of
Argentine troops was on t.his city, the firefights Look place on the
mountains in igs vicinity. Three days laLter Lhe Argentine troops were
defeated on those same mountains and Stanley presented the 1ast threat
from occupying troop on the islands.
Fortunately for both sides, or the night of June a4, J.982, t.he
Argentine forces surrendered aE the Port of Stanley without a fight; a
bat.tle that could have claim the lives of soldiers from both sides as
we1I as the civilians Lhat inhabited the city-port. General Mario
I t
I
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Men6ndez from the Argentine Army was the
surrender Lo the Brit.ish
official signing officer of
forces. The War for Lhethe ArgenLine
Falklands/ttlalvinas had come to an end.
According to Argentine soldiers' accounLs, the Argentine ground
forces did not have the necessary eguipmenL to fight t.he war. Many of
the Argentine weaponry was faulLy and in many cases ammunition was
expired. In one parLicular case, an Argentine veteran, .Iorge Altieri,
tells how mosL of their rifles jammed upon engaging the advancing
British forces. Such f actors played a vit.al role in the def eat of t.he
Argentine ground forces.
The news of the surrender of the troops was devastat.ing for the
people of Argent.ina. Wit.hin days of it, Leopoldo Galtieri was removed
from power and for t.he next several years he faced numerous civilian
and military court t.rials were he was found guilty of mismanagement of
the war along with other civil righLs viofations committed under his
command during the time of the Milit.ary .Tunta government. Galtieri
served several years in prison for his crimes but in 1991 he received
a pardon from the then Argentine President Carlos Menem.
To t.he surviving soldiers of both Armies, the events of the
Falklands/Malvinas War were psychologically devastat,ing. More British
veterans, Iives have been c1aimed by suicide Lhan the number of
British soldiers that died during the conflict. By May of 2002, the
tot.al number of suicide cases among t.he Falklands/Mal-vinas veterans
had reached 264. A total of 258 British soldiers were killed during
Ehe struggle to reEake the islands. Up Eo the presenE year, there has
I t
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been an estimated 400 cases of suicide among the Argentine veterans of
this war.
CurrenLIy, the Falklands/l'talvinas isl-ands are an overseas
expansion of t.he United Kingdom. They are under the conLrol and
administration of the British governmenL, but, Argentina st.i11 claims
them as their owrr. Nonetheless, the two naLions have diplomatic and
trading relations.
Af ter t.he war in ]-982 , Great Brit.ain set.tled a maj or military
base in Stanley Lo prevent the possible overrun of the islands should
diplomacy with Argentine fail again. Commercial flights land at this
massive milit.ary complex on a daily bases, but the tensions of war are
presenL in everyday life. Commercial aircrafts are commonly escorLed
by Royal Air Force jet fighters Lo ensure Lhe security of civilian air
travel-ers.
While Great Britain was
Falklands/Malvinas in L882,
United Kingdom has Lhe right
constant Lopic of debate.
favored by most nations
Lhe debate over whether
to claim and administer
for retaking the
Argentina or Lhe
the islands is a
In the end, t.he islands have proven to be purely a symbol of
The islands do not,national pride for Great Britain and Argentina.
presenL
in them
a major world economical advantage. The major source of income
is due to f ishing. When t.he worl-d renown
Jorge Luis Borges, was asked
Falklands/ualvinas conflict, he
Argentina and Great Britain was as
about his own
replied that The
"a guarrel between
Argentine writer
opinion of the
conflict between
two bald men for
t I I
possession of a
counLry needed
comb!"s wiLh
the
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this statement, he implied that neit.her
that t.he conf lict was a senseless war
not have a purposeful use of a small
islands,
that didbetween two nations
group of bare-lands in the South Atlantic Ocean.
While t.he future
the ArgenLine's current
of the Falk1ands/Malvinas is uncertain due Lo
claims over t.he islands, a conclusion t.o what
nati-on these islands belong Lo cannot be drawn. After all, the history
of the New Wor1d was shaped t.hrough bloodyof the colonizat.ion
bat.tles. It. can then be said that. in our modern era, Great Britain has
earned Lhe tit.le to the islands by def eating Argent.ina '
The unforLunaLe reality of the fragmenLed world we live in is
that naLions wage war against, each other over economic, political
and/or sovereignty issues without. regarding the loss of human 1ife.
The former United States Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam War
era, Robert S. McNamera, declared in an interview in 2003 that war is
human nature and that
the Falklands/Malvinas
it cannoE be avoided. History textbooks
War as a modern confl-ict that, Iasted
months from the morning of April 2, 1-982;
explorers set. their
but in reality,
when the first EuroPean
Lhem for their empires.
eyes on them and
It. is a conflict t.hat has not. yet ended
presenL
a couple
it began
claimed
sRasorr 5
ftr
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